Niccoló Machiavelli

Niccoló Machiavelli                                                                                               2017-10-11

Medieval politician and author Niccoló Machiavelli is the source of political power struggles and racing games that today occur in the world. Game of thrones is known as television series such as James Town, Black Sails, Rome and House of Cards. It seems that all these TV series about power games are the most important interpretations of a script written around 1513 in the village of Sant' Andrea in Percussina in Tuscany, Italy. The manuscript title was Il principe (italian). The book was written by a bitter former civil servant in Florence's foreign administration. Niccoló Machiavelli (1468-1527). The book was about the exercise of power on moral and religious politics that prevailed in the Middle Ages Europe and Italy in particular. Machiavelli writes that "it's better to be feared than being loved if you can not be both".In the summer of 1498 he was appointed an important post in the foreign administration, namely, the first secretary of the second chancellor of Florence's possession, including military and foreign affairs.In the field of office, Machiavelli came in contact with, often eye-to-eye kings, popes and princes.Through the contacts with them, he got the opportunity to observe dreary way they treated their subjects. After he wrote the Prince, he was accused of committing a conspiracy against the Medici family ruler, then the Republic of Florence fell in 1512. He was imprisoned, but few months after he was released. After that he became author and political analyst. In the book The Republic of Discourses he writes about the first ten books of Titus Livius. A country in precarious situation in which Italy was experiencing when the Prince was written he wrote that Italy may require a strong and ruthless ruler, but it is just an emergency solution and the ideal is republic. Enlighteners of Republicans took Machiavelli's ideas and developed, for example, Montesquieu, which laid the foundation for the power-sharing principle. Machiavelli's Liberal Republicanism inspired the founding fathers in the United States, especially John Adams who liked his ideas expressed by  Machiavelli about power sharing and importance for political rationalism. In the first place, Machiavelli thought of a transitional solution in chaotic Italy in a bad time. But the free republic of the book Discorsi was about the long-term goal of a vision of militarily strong and independent but above all united Italy. Machiavelli's vision became real after 343 years after his death.

Charlottesville

Statement by former US presidents

Aug. 17 2017

The living two Republican Presidents' comment on the recent events in Charlottesville FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE August 16, 2017

   STATEMENT BY FORMER PRESIDENTS GEORGE H. W. BUSH AND GEORGE W. BUSH

Kennebunkport — Following is a statement by former Presidents George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush:

"America must always reject racial bigotry, anti-Semitism, and hatred in all forms. As we pray for Charlottesville, we are reminded of

the fundamental truths recorded by that city’s most prominent citizen in the Declaration of Independence: we are all created equal and

endowed by our Creator with unalienable rights. We know these truths to be everlasting because we have seen the decency and greatness of our country."

  End

May 20, 2017

The Constitution of the United States, Art. 2, S. 4

The Constitution of the United States, Art. 2, S. 4

Some of the grounds that a sitting president such as Trump of the USA can be impeached?

The Constitution of the United States, Art. 2, S. 4, provides that the president, vice-president, and civil officers of the United States shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of treason, bribery, and/or other high crimes and misdemeanors.

As for president Trump, it appears that he is already a subject of investigation following 

a number of potential accusations which could be a breach of the US Constitution.

One most likely breach, if stablished by the ongoing investigations is what is called 

"an obstruction of justice" following president Trump´s abrupt firing of James Comey 

FBI's director knowing FBI's ongoing investigation on the executive branch of power.

LEGAL DEFINITION OF OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE

1. The defendent acted with "corrupt" intent.

2. The defendent knew judicial proceedings were pending and wanted to interfere.

3. Defendent's action likely to affect these proceedings.

Given the above mentioned situations, it is therefore likely that president Trump

would be held accountable with obstruction of justice, if proved. It will in turn

trigger Art. 2, S. 4, of the US Constitution.

Failure at 10 Dawning Street over Brexit deal

EU representatives and UK´s PM clashed at the working dinner at 10 Dawning street over would be Brexit deal between UK and EU to the detriment of the Brexiters.

ILL-GOTTEN PROPERTIES IN EUROPE

 Dec.2, 2016

Real estate belonging to the Bongo
family Seized by the courts in France

Real estate in Paris and Nice, belonging to the family of Gabonese President Ali Bongo, have recently been seized by investigating judges who investigate conditions for the acquisition of wealth in France by several African heads of state. According to concordant sources. The investigating judges seized a real estate civil society, the SCI Emeraude, according to legal sources and close to the file. According to several sources, this structure which allows the ownership of a property by several people owns a villa in Nice, on the French Riviera, and a mansion in Paris, in the chic and posh 16th arrondissement . This investigation, known as "ill-gotten property", is the result of complaints lodged from 2007 by several anti-corruption associations, such as Sherpa or Transparency International, which denounced embezzlement of public funds enabling them to build up important assets in France. The share of African Heads of State or their entourage in Gabon, chaired at the time by Omar Bongo, Congo and Equatorial Guinea.

Gabon does not confirm

Seizures have already taken place concerning the family of Denis Sassou Nguesso, who has been the head of the Congo for more than 30 years, and that of the Equatorial Guinean President Teodoro Obiang Nguema, in power since 1979, but these are the first Concerning Gabon, according to the president of Sherpa, Mr. William Bourdon. "Finally, the Bongo chapter opens, it is just beginning, the triptych will end," said Bourdon, who is also a lawyer for Transparency International France. One of Gabon's lawyers, Pierre Haik, did not confirm the information and did not comment. According to elements of the investigation, the SCI Emeraude was created in 1997. Omar Bongo, who died in 2009, his wife Edith, also deceased, and a daughter of Omar Bongo, Pascaline, have held shares. This SCI acquired the mansion of Rue Dosnes for 23 million francs (3.5 million euros) and the villa Saint-Ange in Nice in 1999 for 11.5 million francs (1.75 million francs) According to these elements of the survey. The investigating judges, assisted by investigators from the Central Office for the Suppression of Major Financial Crime (OCRGDF), listed many other property belonging to the Bongo family. According to a document on "ill-gotten goods" published in 2009 by Transparency International France, the Bongo family and its relatives owned at the time in France "33 properties, most in the most exclusive districts of Paris, others on the French Riviera ".

______________________________________________________________________________________ 

Monday december 5 2016

Recent Sarah Olneys victory for the Libdems in London´s Richemond Park by election is a clear indication for the ongoing ill planned BREXIT. 

BREXIT-should I stay or should I go

What is going on in UK reminds me a constitutional disorder. Prime Minster May´s government doe n´t know what to do in the aftermath of the BREXIT referendum. Well, Should it rely on the Parliament or should it be a matter for the courts of law to decide on the legality of BREXIT. According the British daily newspaper The Independent, I quote "The Attorney General Jeremy Wright is to warn Supreme Court judges that they should steer clear of getting involved in political decisions as the Government goes to the Supreme Court in the latest stage of the legal battle over Brexit. Attorney General Jeremy Wright will lead the case for Theresa May’s administration in its bid to overturn a High Court decision made earlier this year, which secured Parliament the right to vote on launching Brexit talks" unquote. The question is when and the Supreme Court judges were involved in politically motivated court rulings? Such a comment would really put the whole country in suspense. 

Friday 13-12-2013

2014 European parliament candidate and county council for the Swedish Liberal party

EU Election 2014 countdown: Less than a year to go

Europe's fiscal and economic crisis has affected European society and politics at all levels in the Union. The concern that there is a democratic deficit in the EU and a growing disconnect between European citizens and their EU institutions is now widely shared across Europe. The 2014 EU election may suffer from low turnout, however, 2014 may also see the strong mobilisation of voters in favour of radical nationalist and anti-EU parties.

Together with our liberal member parties across the European continent we are translating the principle of freedom into politics, economics and all other areas of our societies.

Abdulkadir A. Mohammed

EU Parliament candidat and Södermanland's County Council candidate for the Swedish Liberals

Ne bis in idem is a legal principle that restricts the possibility of a defendant to be tried and presecuted repeatedly. In Europe, via Article 54 of the Convention on the Implementation of the Schengen Agreement (CISA; integrated into EU law by the Treaty of Amsterdam) and Article 4 of the 7th Protocol of the European Convention on Human Rights. The relevant case law of the ECJ and the ECtHR has implications for the systems of criminal and administrative law in European states, as well as for the interpretation and application of the principle in some areas of EU law, such as competition law. it

It is also important to note that this principle, as applied at the Rome Statute, cannot independently  be properly understood and applied independently, but  needs to be held in conjunction with the principle of complementarity.

It is in latin and origanates from latin law, it literally it means not again about the same. 

Other realted terminology:

French word now part of English criminal law terminology. Autre fois acquit or the english terminology double jeopardy.

Refers to an accused who cannot be tried for a crime because the record shows he has already been subjected to trial for the same conduct and was acquitted

If the accused maintains that the previous trial resulted in conviction, he or she pleads "autrefois convict."

Autrefois attaint is another similar term; "attainted" for a felony, a person cannot be tried again for the same offence.

ICJ-Judgement on Kenya´s preliminary objections

2 FEBRUARY 2017 

JUDGMENT 

MARITIME DELIMITATION IN THE INDIAN OCEAN 

(SOMALIA v. KENYA) 

PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS 


___________ 



DÉLIMITATION MARITIME DANS L’OCÉAN INDIEN 

(SOMALIE c. KENYA) 

EXCEPTIONS PRÉLIMINAIRES 




2 FÉVRIER 2017 

ARRÊT

______________________________________________________________________________________

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 



YEAR 2017 
2017 2 February General List No. 161 
2 February 2017 



MARITIME DELIMITATION IN THE INDIAN OCEAN 

(SOMALIA v. KENYA) 



PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS 


Somalia and Kenya both parties to United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea  Article 76, paragraph 8, of UNCLOS  Role of Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf  Article 4 of Annex II of UNCLOS  Annex I of CLCS Rules of Procedure 
Commission requires prior consent from all States that are parties to unresolved land or maritime disputes  2009 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)  History of each Party’s submissions to CLCS with respect to outer limits of continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles Objections by both Parties to CLCS’s consideration of each other’s submissions raised and withdrawn. 

Consideration of Parties’ submissions by CLCS. 

Jurisdiction based on declarations under Article 36, paragraph 2, of Statute of the Court 
Two objections raised  Jurisdiction and admissibility. 


Kenya’s first preliminary objection. 

Contentions by Kenya  Court lacks jurisdiction as a result of one of Kenya’s reservations to its optional clause declaration  Disputes in regard to which parties have agreed “to have recourse to some other method or methods of settlement” excluded from the Court’s jurisdiction. MOU is an agreement on such other method of settlement  Relevant provisions of UNCLOS on dispute settlement also amount to agreement on method of settlement. 
Analysis by the Court  Legal status of MOU under international law  Signing of MOU and registration with United Nations Secretariat  MOU a written document recording Parties’ agreement on certain points governed by international law  Provision addressing entry into force indicative of instrument’s binding character  Somali Minister for National Planning duly authorized as signatory  MOU to enter into force upon signature  No ratification requirement in MOU  MOU is a valid treaty that entered into force upon signature and is binding on Parties under international law. 

Interpretation of MOU  Rules of interpretation in Articles 31 and 32 of Vienna Convention  Ordinary meaning, context and object and purpose to be considered as a whole 
Role of CLCS in process of delineation of outer limits of continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles  Distinction between delineation and delimitation. 

Title of MOU  Meaning of individual paragraphs  Title and first five paragraphs indicative of a purpose  MOU a no-objection agreement enabling CLCS to make recommendations despite existence of a dispute  Whether sixth paragraph of MOU contains agreed dispute settlement method  Sixth paragraph relating only to continental shelf 

Delineation of outer limits of continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles without prejudice to maritime boundary delimitation  Similarity in language between Article 83, paragraph 1, of UNCLOS and sixth paragraph of MOU  Sixth paragraph did not prevent Parties from engaging in negotiations in good faith to reach agreement  No temporal restriction contained in sixth paragraph in that regard  Sixth paragraph not prescribing a method of dispute settlement 
Parties did not consider themselves bound to wait for CLCS recommendations before engaging in negotiations  Interpretation confirmed by travaux préparatoires and circumstances in which MOU was concluded  Initiative of Special Representative of UN Secretary-General for Somalia  Assistance provided by Norway  Conclusion that MOU not an agreement “to have recourse to some other method of methods of settlement” within meaning of Kenya’s reservation to its optional clause declaration  Kenya’s reservation not applicable. 
Whether Part XV (“Settlement of Disputes”) of UNCLOS amounted to agreement on a method of settlement of maritime boundary dispute within meaning of Kenya’s reservation 
Structure and provisions of Part XV  Article 282  Ordinary meaning of Article 282 
encompasses agreement to Court’s jurisdiction resulting from optional clause declarations 
Interpretation confirmed by travaux préparatoires  Procedure before the Court to apply “in lieu” of procedures under Section 2 of Part XV  Part XV does not provide for “other method” of dispute settlement within meaning of Kenya’s reservation  Finding that the Court has jurisdiction gives effect to intent reflected in Kenya’s declaration  Present case does not, by virtue of Part XV, fall outside scope of Parties’ consent to the Court’s jurisdiction. 
Conclusion that neither MOU nor Part XV of UNCLOS within scope of Kenya’s reservation to its optional clause declaration  Kenya’s preliminary objection to jurisdiction rejected. 

Kenya’s second preliminary objection. 

Contention by Kenya that Application is inadmissible for two reasons  First argument that under MOU Parties agreed to delimit their boundary by negotiation only after CLCS review of their submissions  Previous finding by the Court that MOU did not contain such agreement 
Premise of objection rejected  Second argument that Somalia’s withdrawal of consent to CLCS consideration was in breach of MOU  Invocation of clean hands doctrine  Finding of the Court that admissibility of an application not per se affected by breach of a treaty at issue in a case  No need to address in general question of whether conduct of Applicant might render application inadmissible  Kenya’s preliminary objection to admissibility rejected. 



JUDGMENT 


Present: President ABRAHAM; Vice-President YUSUF; Judges OWADA, TOMKA, BENNOUNA, CANÇADO TRINDADE, GREENWOOD, XUE, DONOGHUE, GAJA, SEBUTINDE, BHANDARI, ROBINSON, CRAWFORD, GEVORGIAN; Judge ad hoc GUILLAUME; Registrar COUVREUR. 


In the case concerning maritime delimitation in the Indian Ocean, 
between 
the Federal Republic of Somalia, 
 
represented by 
H.E. Mr. Abdusalam Hadliyeh Omer, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Somalia, 
as Agent; 
H.E. Mr. Ali Said Faqi, Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Somalia to the Kingdom of Belgium, 
as Co-Agent; 
Ms Mona Al-Sharmani, Attorney-at-Law, Senior Legal Adviser to the President of the Federal Republic of Somalia, 
as Deputy-Agent; 
Mr. Paul S. Reichler, Attorney-at-Law, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bars of the United States Supreme Court and the District of Columbia, 
Mr. Alain Pellet, Emeritus Professor, University of Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense, former member and former chairman of the International Law Commission, member of the Institut de droit international, 
Mr. Philippe Sands, Q.C., Professor of International Law at University College London, Barrister at Matrix Chambers, London, 
as Counsel and Advocates; 
Mr. Lawrence H. Martin, Attorney-at-Law, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bars of the United States Supreme Court, the District of Columbia and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 
Ms Alina Miron, Professor of International Law at the University of Angers, 
Mr. Edward Craven, Barrister at Matrix Chambers, London, 
Mr. Nicholas M. Renzler, Attorney-at-Law, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bars of the District of Columbia and the State of New York, 
as Counsel; 
Ms Lea Main-Klingst, Matrix Chambers, London, 
as Junior Counsel; 
Mr. Mohamed Omar, Senior Adviser to the President of the Federal Republic of Somalia, 
Mr. Ahmed Ali Dahir, Attorney-General of the Federal Republic of Somalia, 

H.E. Mr. Yusuf Garaad Omar, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Somalia to the United Nations, New York, 
Admiral Farah Ahmed Omar, former Admiral of the Somali Navy and Chairman of the Research Institute for Ocean Affairs, Mogadishu, 
Mr. Daud Awes, Spokesperson of the President of the Federal Republic of Somalia, 
Mr. Abubakar Mohamed Abubakar, Director, Maritime Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
as Advisers; 
Ms Kathryn Kalinowski, Foley Hoag LLP, Washington, DC, 
Ms Nancy Lopez, Foley Hoag LLP, Washington, DC, 
as Assistants, 
and 
the Republic of Kenya, 
represented by 
Professor Githu Muigai, E.G.H., S.C., Attorney-General of the Republic of Kenya, 
as Agent; 
H.E. Ms Rose Makena Muchiri, Ambassador of the Republic of Kenya to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 
as Co-Agent; 
Mr. Vaughan Lowe, Q.C., member of the Bar of England and Wales, Emeritus Professor of International Law, University of Oxford, member of the Institut de droit international, 
Mr. Payam Akhavan, LL.M. S.J.D. (Harvard), Professor of International Law, McGill University, member of the State Bar of New York and of the Law Society of Upper Canada, member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, 
Mr. Mathias Forteau, Professor at the University of Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense, former member of the International Law Commission, 
Mr. Alan Boyle, Professor of International Law at the University of Edinburgh, member of the Bar of England and Wales, 
Mr. Karim A. A. Khan, Q.C., member of the Bar of England and Wales, 
as Counsel and Advocates;

Ms Amy Sander, member of the Bar of England and Wales, 
Ms Philippa Webb, Reader in Public International Law, King’s College, London, member of the Bar of England and Wales and of the New York Bar, 
Mr. Eirik Bjorge, Junior Research Fellow in Law at the University of Oxford, 
as Counsel; 
Hon. Senator Amos Wako, Chair of the Senate Standing Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, 
Hon. Samuel Chepkonga, Chair of the Parliamentary Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs, 
Ms Juster Nkoroi, E.B.S., Head, Kenya International Boundaries Office, 
Mr. Michael Guchayo Gikuhi, Director, Kenya International Boundaries Office, 
Ms Njeri Wachira, Head, International Law Division, Office of the Attorney-General and Department of Justice, 
Ms Stella Munyi, Director, Legal Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Ms Stella Orina, Deputy Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Mr. Rotiken Kaitikei, Foreign Service Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Ms Pauline Mcharo, Senior Principal State Counsel, Office of the Attorney-General and Department of Justice, 
Ms Wanjiku Wakogi, Governance Adviser, Office of the Attorney-General and Department of Justice, 
Mr. Samuel Kaumba, State Counsel, Office of the Attorney-General and Department of Justice, 
Mr. Hudson Andambi, Ministry of Energy, 
as Advisers, 
THE COURT, 
composed as above, 
after deliberation, 
delivers the following Judgment:

On 28 August 2014, the Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia (hereinafter “Somalia”) filed in the Registry of the Court an Application instituting proceedings against the Republic of Kenya (hereinafter “Kenya”) concerning a dispute in relation to “the establishment of the single maritime boundary between Somalia and Kenya in the Indian Ocean delimiting the territorial sea, exclusive economic zone . . . and continental shelf, including the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles”. 
In its Application, Somalia seeks to found the jurisdiction of the Court on the declarations made, pursuant to Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court, by Somalia on 11 April 1963 and by Kenya on 19 April 1965. 
In accordance with Article 40, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court, the Registrar immediately communicated the Application to the Government of Kenya; and, under paragraph 3 of that Article, all other States entitled to appear before the Court were notified of the Application. 
Since the Court included upon the Bench no judge of Kenyan nationality, Kenya proceeded to exercise its right conferred by Article 31, paragraph 2, of the Statute to choose a judge ad hoc to sit in the case; it chose Mr. Gilbert Guillaume. 
By an Order of 16 October 2014, the President fixed 13 July 2015 as the time-limit for the filing of the Memorial of Somalia and 27 May 2016 for the filing of the Counter-Memorial of Kenya. Somalia filed its Memorial within the time-limit so prescribed. 
On 7 October 2015, within the time-limit set by Article 79, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court, Kenya raised preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the Court and to the admissibility of the Application. Consequently, by an Order of 9 October 2015, the Court, noting that, by virtue of Article 79, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court, the proceedings on the merits were suspended, and taking account of Practice Direction V, fixed 5 February 2016 as the time-limit for the presentation by Somalia of a written statement of its observations and submissions on the preliminary objections raised by Kenya. Somalia filed such a statement within the time-limit so prescribed, and the case thus became ready for hearing in respect of the preliminary objections. Pursuant to the instructions of the Court under Article 43 of the Rules of Court, the Registrar addressed to States parties to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea the notifications provided for in Article 63, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Court. In addition, the Registrar addressed to the European Union, which is also party to that Convention, the notification provided for in Article 43, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court, as adopted on 29 September 2005, and asked that organization whether or not it intended to furnish observations under that provision. In response, the Director-General of the Legal Service of the European Commission indicated that the European Commission, which represents the European Union, did not intend to submit observations in the case. By a communication dated 21 January 2016, the Government of the Republic of Colombia, referring to Article 53, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court, asked to be furnished with copies of the pleadings and documents annexed in the case. Having ascertained the views of the Parties in accordance with that same provision, the Court decided, taking into account the objection raised by one Party, that it would not be appropriate to grant that request. By a letter dated 17 March 2016, the Registrar duly communicated that decision to the Government of Colombia and to the Parties. Pursuant to Article 53, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court, the Court, after ascertaining the views of the Parties, decided that copies of the pleadings and the documents annexed would be made accessible to the public on the opening of the oral proceedings. Public hearings on the preliminary objections raised by Kenya were held from Monday 19 to Friday 23 September 2016, at which the Court heard the oral arguments of: For Kenya: Mr. Githu Muigai, Mr. Payam Akhavan, Mr. Karim A. A. Khan, Mr. Mathias Forteau, H.E. Ms Rose Makena Muchiri, 
Mr. Alan Boyle, Mr. Vaughan Lowe. For Somalia: Ms Mona Al-Sharmani, Mr. Alain Pellet, Mr. Paul S. Reichler, Mr. Philippe Sands. 
At the hearings, a Member of the Court put questions to the Parties, to which replies were given in writing within the time-limit fixed by the President in accordance with Article 61, paragraph 4, of the Rules of Court. Pursuant to Article 72 of the Rules of Court, each of the Parties submitted comments on the written replies provided by the other. 
In the Application, the following claims were presented by Somalia: 
“The Court is asked to determine, on the basis of international law, the complete course of the single maritime boundary dividing all the maritime areas appertaining to Somalia and to Kenya in the Indian Ocean, including in the continental shelf beyond 200 [nautical miles]. 
Somalia further requests the Court to determine the precise geographical co-ordinates of the single maritime boundary in the Indian Ocean.” In the written proceedings on the merits, the following submissions were presented on behalf of the Government of Somalia in its Memorial: “On the basis of the facts and law set forth in this Memorial, Somalia respectfully requests the Court: 
1. To determine the complete course of the maritime boundary between Somalia and Kenya in the Indian Ocean, including in the continental shelf beyond 200 [nautical miles], on the basis of international law. 
2. To determine the maritime boundary between Somalia and Kenya in the Indian Ocean on the basis of the following geographical coordinates: 

Point No. Latitude Longitude 1 (LBT) 1° 39' 44.07" S 41° 33' 34.57" E 2 1° 40' 05.92" S 41° 34' 05.26" E 3 1° 41' 11.45" S 41° 34' 06.12" E 4 1° 43' 09.34" S 41° 36' 33.52" E 5 1° 43' 53.72" S 41° 37' 48.21" E 6 1° 44' 09.28" S 41° 38' 13.26" E 7 (intersection with 12 [nautical-mile] limit) 1° 47' 54.60" S 41° 43' 36.04" E 8 2° 19' 01.09" S 42° 28' 10.27" E 9 2° 30' 56.65" S 42° 46' 18.90" E 10 (intersection with 200 [nautical-mile] limit) 3° 34' 57.05" S 44° 18' 49.83" E 11 (intersection with 350 [nautical-mile] limit) 5° 00' 25.71" S 46° 22' 33.36" E 
3. To adjudge and declare that Kenya, by its conduct in the disputed area, has violated its international obligations to respect the sovereignty, and sovereign rights and jurisdiction of Somalia, and is responsible under international law to make full reparation to Somalia, including inter alia by making available to Somalia all seismic data acquired in areas that are determined by the Court to be subject to the sovereignty and/or sovereign rights and jurisdiction of Somalia, and to repair in full all damage that has been suffered by Somalia by the payment of appropriate compensation. 
(All points referenced are referred to WGS-84.)” In the preliminary objections, the following submissions were presented on behalf of the Government of Kenya: 
“For the reasons set out above, Kenya respectfully submits, pursuant to Rule 79 (9) of the Rules of Court, that the Court adjudge and declare that: 
The case brought by Somalia against Kenya is not within the jurisdiction of the Court and is inadmissible, and is accordingly dismissed.” In the written statement of its observations and submissions on the preliminary objections raised by Kenya, the following submissions were presented on behalf of the Government of Somalia: “For these reasons, Somalia respectfully requests the Court: 
1. To reject the Preliminary Objections raised by the Republic of Kenya; and 
2. To find that it has jurisdiction to entertain the Application filed by the Federal Republic of Somalia.” 
At the oral proceedings on the preliminary objections, the following submissions were presented by the Parties: On behalf of the Government of Kenya, 
at the hearing of 21 September 2016: “The Republic of Kenya respectfully requests the Court to adjudge and declare that: The case brought by Somalia against Kenya is not within the jurisdiction of the Court and is inadmissible, and is accordingly dismissed.” 
On behalf of the Government of Somalia, 
at the hearing of 23 September 2016: “On the basis of its Written Statement of 5 February 2016, and its oral pleadings, Somalia respectfully requests the Court: 
1. To reject the Preliminary Objections raised by the Republic of Kenya; and 
2. To find that it has jurisdiction to entertain the Application filed by the Federal Republic of Somalia.”

I. INTRODUCTION 

15. Somalia and Kenya are adjacent States on the coast of East Africa. Somalia is located in the Horn of Africa. It borders Kenya to the south-west, Ethiopia to the west and Djibouti to the north-west. Somalia’s coastline faces the Gulf of Aden to the north and the Indian Ocean to the east. Kenya, for its part, shares a land boundary with Somalia to the north-east, Ethiopia to the north, South Sudan to the north-west, Uganda to the west and Tanzania to the south. Its coastline faces the Indian Ocean. Both States signed the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereinafter “UNCLOS” or the “Convention”) on 10 December 1982. Kenya and Somalia ratified UNCLOS on 2 March and 24 July 1989, respectively, and the Convention entered into force for the Parties on 16 November 1994. Under Article 76, paragraph 8, of UNCLOS, a State party to the Convention intending to establish the outer limits of its continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles shall submit information on such limits to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (hereinafter “CLCS” or the “Commission”). The role of the Commission is to make recommendations to coastal States on matters related to the establishment of the outer limits of their continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles (see paragraph 66 below). Pursuant to Article 4 of Annex II to UNCLOS, a State party intending to establish such limits shall submit the required information to the Commission “as soon as possible but in any case within 10 years of the entry into force of [the] Convention for that State”. 
In May 2001, bearing in mind the difficulties encountered by some developing States in meeting the requirements of Article 4 of Annex II to the Convention, the eleventh Meeting of States Parties to UNCLOS decided that the ten-year period (referred to in Article 4 of Annex II) would be deemed to have commenced on 13 May 1999 for those States parties to the Convention for which UNCLOS had entered into force before 13 May 1999 (see doc. SPLOS/72). Consequently, the ten-year time-limit for such States to make their respective submissions to the CLCS was due to expire on 13 May 2009. Kenya and Somalia were among those States to which this time-limit applied. In June 2008, at the eighteenth Meeting of States Parties to UNCLOS, it was decided that the ten-year time-limit could be satisfied by the submission to the Secretary-General of the United Nations of preliminary information indicative of the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles (see doc. SPLOS/183). With regard to disputed maritime areas, under Annex I of the CLCS Rules of Procedure, entitled “Submissions in case of a dispute between States with opposite or adjacent coasts or in other cases of unresolved land or maritime disputes”, the Commission requires the prior consent of all States concerned before it will consider submissions regarding such areas (see paragraphs 68-69 below). In particular, Article 5 (a) of this Annex reads as follows: 
“In cases where a land or maritime dispute exists, the Commission shall not consider and qualify a submission made by any of the States concerned in the dispute. However, the Commission may consider one or more submissions in the areas under dispute with prior consent given by all States that are parties to such a dispute.” 
On 7 April 2009, the Kenyan Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Somali Minister for National Planning and International Cooperation signed a “Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Kenya and the Transitional Federal Government of the Somali Republic to grant to each other No-Objection in respect of submissions on the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf beyond 200 Nautical Miles to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf” (hereinafter the “MOU”), the text of which is reproduced at paragraph 37 below. On 14 April 2009, Somalia submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations preliminary information indicative of the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, enclosing a copy of the MOU. On 6 May 2009, Kenya deposited with the CLCS its submission with respect to the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. On 3 September 2009, at the twenty-fourth session of the CLCS, Kenya made an oral presentation of its submission. The MOU was registered by the Secretariat of the United Nations on 11 June 2009 at Kenya’s request. On 19 August 2009, in a letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Prime Minister of Somalia referred to the MOU and reiterated Somalia’s consent to the CLCS considering Kenya’s submission. However, as will be explained in further detail below (see paragraph 38), by a letter dated 2 March 2010, the Permanent Representative of Somalia to the United Nations forwarded a letter from the Somali Prime Minister dated 10 October 2009, informing the Secretary-General of the United Nations that the MOU had been rejected by the Transitional Federal Parliament of Somalia, and requesting that it be treated “as non-actionable”. On 4 February 2014, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Somalia sent two letters to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. In the first letter, Somalia objected to the registration with the Secretariat of the United Nations, nearly five years earlier, of what it termed the “[p]urported MoU”. In the second letter, Somalia objected to the consideration by the CLCS of Kenya’s submission on the ground that there existed a maritime boundary dispute between itself and Kenya and that the MOU was “void and of no effect”.  Given Somalia’s objection, the CLCS determined, during its thirty-fourth session (held from 27 January to 14 March 2014), that it “was not in a position to proceed with the establishment of a subcommission [to consider Kenya’s submission] at that time”.  The Parties subsequently engaged in negotiations on various questions of maritime delimitation. The Foreign Ministers of Kenya and Somalia held a meeting on 21 March 2014, at which it was agreed that a technical meeting be held among relevant officials. A first bilateral meeting was held in Nairobi on 26 and 27 March 2014. On 28 and 29 July 2014, a second bilateral meeting was held in the same city which was attended by the two Foreign Ministers. The Parties agreed to reconvene on 25 and 26 August 2014 for a third meeting, but that meeting never took place. In view of the partial change in the membership of the CLCS that had occurred since the twenty-fourth session of the Commission in 2009 (at which Kenya had first made an oral presentation of its submission), the Government of Kenya, by means of a Note Verbale dated 7 July 2014, requested that the CLCS allow it the opportunity to make another oral presentation. This presentation was made on 3 September 2014 at the thirty-fifth session of the CLCS. Taking note thereof, the Commission reiterated its decision taken at the thirty-fourth session of the CLCS (see paragraph 20 above) to defer further consideration of the submission. On 21 July 2014, Somalia deposited with the CLCS its submission with respect to the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. On 28 August 2014, Somalia filed in the Registry of the Court an Application instituting proceedings against Kenya. By means of a Note Verbale addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations dated 24 October 2014, and with reference to the communications of Somalia of 4 February 2014 (see paragraph 19 above), Kenya protested against “the actions by the Somali Federal Republic” aimed at blocking the CLCS’s consideration of Kenya’s submission. By a further Note Verbale addressed to the Secretary-General dated 4 May 2015, Kenya, in turn, “object[ed] to the consideration of the Submission by Somalia”. However, in a Note Verbale addressed to the Secretary-General dated 30 June 2015, Kenya withdrew its objection to the CLCS’s consideration of Somalia’s submission. On 7 July 2015, Somalia sent a letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations in which it withdrew its objection to the CLCS’s consideration of Kenya’s submission. On 16 July 2015, Somalia submitted an Amended Executive Summary of its submission to the CLCS, which was intended to replace the earlier Summary submitted by Somalia on 21 July 2014. At its thirty-ninth session in New York held from October to December 2015, a CLCS subcommission met to begin consideration of Kenya’s submission. In February and March 2016, the subcommission commenced the main scientific and technical examination of the submission. It continued its consideration of the submission in July-August, and October-November 2016, and intends to resume its consideration thereof at the forty-third session in February 2017. Regarding its submission, Somalia made a presentation thereof on 22 July 2016 during the forty-first session of the CLCS. The CLCS deferred further consideration of Somalia’s submission until it was next in line to be considered in the order in which submissions had been received. Somalia invokes as the basis for the jurisdiction of the Court in the present case the declarations which Somalia and Kenya have made under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court. Somalia deposited its declaration with the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 11 April 1963 while Kenya did so on 19 April 1965. In the view of Somalia, “[n]o condition or reservation to either declaration applies”. Kenya, however, raised, pursuant to Article 79 of the Rules of Court, two preliminary objections. One concerns the jurisdiction of the Court, the other the admissibility of the Application. The Court will begin by considering Kenya’s objection to the

Court’s jurisdiction. 
II. THE FIRST PRELIMINARY OBJECTION: THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
In its first preliminary objection, Kenya asserts that one of the reservations in its declaration accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court applies in this case. Kenya’s declaration, in its relevant part, provides that: “the Republic of Kenya . . . accepts, in conformity with paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice until such time as notice may be given to terminate such acceptance, as compulsory ipso facto and without special Agreement, and on the basis and condition of reciprocity, the jurisdiction over all disputes arising after 12th December, 1963, with regard to situations or facts subsequent to that date, other than: 
 Disputes in regard to which the parties to the dispute have agreed or shall agree to have recourse to some other method or methods of settlement.” (United Nations, Treaty Series (UNTS), Vol. 531, p. 114.) Kenya argues that its reservation applies for two reasons. First, Kenya contends that in the MOU (see paragraph 17 above) the Parties agreed on a method of settlement of their maritime boundary dispute other than having recourse to the Court, namely by agreement to be concluded by Somalia and Kenya after the CLCS has made its recommendations to them concerning the establishment of the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. Secondly, Kenya argues that Part XV of UNCLOS makes provision for methods of settlement of disputes concerning the interpretation or application of UNCLOS, to which both Kenya and Somalia are States parties. As neither Party has made a declaration regarding the choice of one or more means of dispute settlement pursuant to Article 287, paragraph 1, of UNCLOS, Kenya submits that the Parties are deemed, under paragraph 3 of that Article, to have accepted arbitration in accordance with Annex VII to UNCLOS for the settlement of disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention. According to Kenya, the relevant provisions of UNCLOS on dispute settlement therefore amount to an agreement “to have recourse to some other method or methods of settlement” within the meaning of Kenya’s reservation, which thus applies in the present case. For its part, Somalia argues that the MOU does not establish a method for resolving the delimitation dispute between the Parties and that, consequently, Kenya’s reservation does not apply in the present case. Moreover, it disagrees with Kenya’s assertion that Part XV of UNCLOS falls within the scope of Kenya’s reservation. In Somalia’s view, the agreement of the Parties to the jurisdiction of the Court  expressed through declarations under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Court’s Statute  takes priority, under Article 282 of UNCLOS, over the procedures provided for in Section 2 of Part XV. 
The Court will first consider the MOU and whether that instrument falls within the scope of Kenya’s reservation. It will begin by examining the legal status of the MOU under international law. Should it find the MOU valid, the Court will embark on its interpretation and outline what effects, if any, the MOU has in respect of the jurisdiction of the Court in this case. If the Court reaches the conclusion that the MOU does not render Kenya’s reservation to its optional clause declaration under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Court’s Statute applicable in the present case, it will then address Kenya’s submission that the case falls outside the Court’s jurisdiction because of the provisions of Part XV of UNCLOS. 
A. The Memorandum of Understanding 
1. The legal status of the MOU under international law 
As noted above (see paragraph 17), on 7 April 2009, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government of Kenya and the Minister for National Planning and International Cooperation of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia signed a “Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Kenya and the Transitional Federal Government of the Somali Republic to grant to each other No-Objection in respect of submissions on the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf beyond 200 Nautical Miles to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf”. In June 2009, the MOU was submitted by Kenya to the Secretariat of the United Nations for registration and publication pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. The Secretariat registered it on 11 June 2009, and published it in the United Nations Treaty Series (UNTS, Vol. 2599, p. 35). 
37. The MOU consists of seven paragraphs, which are unnumbered. In order to facilitate references to the paragraphs, the Court considers it convenient to insert numbering in its analysis. It is also useful to reproduce the text of the MOU in toto. It reads as follows: 
“Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Kenya and the Transitional Federal Government of the Somali Republic to grant to each other No-Objection in respect of submissions on the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf beyond 200 Nautical Miles to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. 
[1] The Government of the Republic of Kenya and the Transitional Federal Government of the Somali Republic, in the spirit of co-operation and mutual understanding have agreed to conclude this Memorandum of Understanding: 
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[2] The delimitation of the continental shelf between the Republic of Kenya and the Somali Republic (hereinafter collectively referred to as ‘the two coastal States’) has not yet been settled. This unresolved delimitation issue between the two coastal States is to be considered as a ‘maritime dispute’. The claims of the two coastal States cover an overlapping area of the continental shelf which constitutes the ‘area under dispute’. 
[3] The two coastal States are conscious that the establishment of the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles is without prejudice to the question of delimitation of the continental shelf between states with opposite or adjacent coasts. While the two coastal States have differing interests regarding the delimitation of the continental shelf in the area under dispute, they have a strong common interest with respect to the establishment of the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, without prejudice to the future delimitation of the continental shelf between them. On this basis the two coastal States are determined to work together to safeguard and promote their common interest with respect to the establishment of the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. 
[4] Before 13 May 2009 the Transitional Federal Government of the Somali Republic intends to submit to the Secretary-General of the United Nations preliminary information indicative of the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. This submission may include the area under dispute. It will solely aim at complying with the time period referred to in article (4) of Annex II to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). It shall not prejudice the positions of the two coastal States with respect to the maritime dispute between them and shall be without prejudice to the future delimitation of maritime boundaries in the area under dispute, including the delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. On this understanding the Republic of Kenya has no objection to the inclusion of the areas under dispute in the submission by the Somali Republic of preliminary information indicative of the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. 
[5] The two coastal States agree that at an appropriate time, in the case of the Republic of Kenya before 13 May 2009, each of them will make separate submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (herein referred to as ‘the Commission’), that may include the area under dispute, asking the Commission to make recommendations with respect to the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles without regard to the delimitation of maritime boundaries between them. The two coastal States hereby give their prior consent to the consideration by the Commission of these submissions in the area under dispute. The submissions made before the Commission and the recommendations approved by the Commission thereon shall not prejudice the positions of the two coastal States with respect to the maritime dispute between them and shall be without prejudice to the future delimitation of maritime boundaries in the area under dispute, including the delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. 
[6] The delimitation of maritime boundaries in the areas under dispute, including the delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, shall be agreed between the two coastal States on the basis of international law after the Commission has concluded its examination of the separate submissions made by each of the two coastal States and made its recommendations to two coastal States concerning the establishment of the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. 
[7] This Memorandum of Understanding shall enter into force upon its signature. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Memorandum of Understanding. 
DONE in Nairobi this 7th day of April Two Thousand and Nine, in duplicate, in the English Language, both texts being equally authentic.” The MOU caused some domestic controversy in Somalia in the months after it was signed. It was debated and rejected by the Transitional Federal Parliament of Somalia on 1 August 2009. In a letter addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations dated 10 October 2009, but only forwarded to him under cover of a letter from the Permanent Representative of Somalia to the United Nations dated 2 March 2010, the Prime Minister of the Transitional Federal Government informed the Secretary-General of this rejection, and “request[ed] the relevant offices of the U.N. to take note of the situation and treat the MOU as non-actionable”. Several years later, in a letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations dated 4 February 2014, the Somali Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation maintained that “no [MOU] is in force”, highlighting that ratification thereof had been rejected by the Parliament of Somalia. In that letter, he referred to customary international law reflected, in his view, in Article 7 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (hereinafter the “Vienna Convention”), which addresses the circumstances in which a person may, by producing “full powers” or otherwise, enter into a treaty on behalf of a State. He contended that the Minister who had signed the MOU “did not produce appropriate documents demonstrating his powers to represent the Somali Republic for the purpose of agreeing to the text of the MOU”, that it was not customary for Somalia to allow that Minister “to enter into binding bilateral arrangements which concern maritime delimitation and the presentation of submissions to the [CLCS] and its consideration of them”, and that the Kenyan representatives had been informed at the time of signing that “the MOU would require ratification”. 

In these proceedings, Somalia does not expressly invoke the alleged invalidity of the MOU as a reason for rejecting the preliminary objection raised by Kenya. It takes the view that it is unnecessary “to determine the legal validity vel non of the MOU” on the basis that

“[e]ven if it were effective (quod non), it does not constitute an agreement on a method for settling the Parties’ maritime boundary dispute, let alone one that could preclude this Court from resolving it on the basis of the Parties’ matching Optional Clause declarations”. 
In its written statement on Kenya’s preliminary objections Somalia nonetheless highlights that the Transitional Federal Charter of the Somali Republic, applicable between 2004 and 2012, “made the President’s authority to sign binding international agreements conditional upon subsequent ratification by Parliament”, and that such ratification did not take place. Somalia argues that, while the MOU “does not expressly require ratification”, the relevant Minister’s “authorization to sign the MOU did not constitute, and could not have constituted, authorization under Somali law for him to dispense with the ratification requirement”. 
For its part, Kenya argues that the MOU is an international treaty, duly registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations, that is legally binding on the Parties. In respect of Somalia’s earlier contentions regarding the absence of authorization on the part of the Minister who signed the MOU, Kenya argues that the Minister had been authorized to sign the MOU by the Prime Minister of Somalia, including in writing by way of “full powers”, and points to the fact that the MOU specifies that both Ministers are “duly authorized by their respective Governments”. In respect of ratification, Kenya emphasizes that the MOU does not refer to a need for ratification, but instead provides “in categorical terms” for its entry into force “upon its signature”. In addition, it contends that there was “nothing in the exchanges leading to adoption of the MOU suggesting that the Parties ever considered a requirement of ratification” and that there is no evidence that its representatives were ever told of such a requirement. Kenya argues that the validity of the MOU was confirmed in Somalia’s April 2009 submission of preliminary information to the CLCS. Kenya further contends that the MOU’s validity was not questioned in a letter from the Somali Prime Minister to the Secretary-General of the United Nations dated 19 August 2009, shortly after the vote in the Parliament of Somalia, but was challenged only at a later date. It contends that any inconsistency with the internal law of Somalia does not affect the validity of the MOU under international law. 
While Somalia has invited the Court to reject Kenya’s preliminary objection without considering the status of the MOU under international law, the Court considers that in order to determine whether the MOU has any effect with respect to its jurisdiction, it is appropriate first to address the issue whether the MOU constitutes a treaty in force between the Parties. Under the customary international law of treaties, which is applicable in this case since neither Somalia nor Kenya is a party to the Vienna Convention, an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law constitutes a treaty (see Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 429, para. 263, referring to Article 2, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention). The MOU is a written document, in which Somalia and Kenya record their agreement on certain points governed by international law. The inclusion of a provision addressing the entry into force of the MOU is indicative of the instrument’s binding character. Kenya considered the MOU to be a treaty, having requested its registration in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations, and Somalia did not protest that registration until almost five years thereafter (see paragraph 19 above). Somalia no longer appears to contest that the Minister who signed the MOU was authorized to do so as a matter of international law. The Court recalls that, under international law, as codified in Article 7 of the Vienna Convention, by virtue of their functions and without having to produce full powers, Heads of State, Heads of Government and Ministers for Foreign Affairs are considered as representing their State for the purpose of performing all acts relating to the conclusion of a treaty. These State representatives, under international law, may also duly authorize other officials to adopt, on behalf of a State, the text of a treaty or to express the consent of the State to be bound by a treaty. The Court observes that the Prime Minister of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia signed, on 6 April 2009, full powers by which he “authorized and empowered” the Somali Minister for National Planning and International Cooperation to sign the MOU. The MOU explicitly states that the two Ministers who signed it were “duly authorized by their respective Governments” to do so. The Court is thus satisfied that, as a matter of international law, the Somali Minister properly represented Somalia in signing the MOU on its behalf. It may be added that the Norwegian diplomat who had, as discussed in further detail below (see paragraphs 100-104), been deeply involved in the drafting of the MOU, informed Kenya, in an email sent before the MOU was signed, that “the President of the Somali Republic has now approved the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding”.

In respect of Somalia’s contentions regarding the ratification requirement under Somali law, the Court recalls that, under the law of treaties, both signature and ratification are recognized means by which a State may consent to be bound by a treaty. As the Court has previously outlined: 

“while in international practice a two-step procedure consisting of signature and ratification is frequently provided for in provisions regarding entry into force of a treaty, there are also cases where a treaty enters into force immediately upon signature. Both customary international law and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties leave it completely up to States which procedure they want to follow” (Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 429, para. 264). The Court notes that the MOU provides, in its final paragraph, that “[t]his Memorandum of Understanding shall enter into force upon its signature” and that it does not contain a ratification requirement. Under customary international law as codified in Article 12, paragraph 1 (a), of the Vienna Convention, a State’s consent to be bound is expressed by signature where the treaty so provides. 
In his letter of 4 February 2014 to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Foreign Minister of Somalia stated that the Kenyan representatives present for the signing of the MOU had been informed orally by the Somali Minister who signed it of the requirement that it be ratified by the Transitional Federal Parliament of Somalia. Kenya denies that such a communication took place and there is no evidence to support Somalia’s assertion. Indeed, any such statement by the Minister would have been inconsistent with the express provision of the MOU regarding its entry into force upon signature. The Court also notes that the full powers, dated 6 April 2009, by which the Prime Minister of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia “authorized and empowered” the Minister to sign the MOU, give no indication that it was Somalia’s intention to sign the MOU subject to ratification. 
In light of the express provision of the MOU that it shall enter into force upon signature, and the terms of the authorization given to the Somali Minister, the Court concludes that this signature expressed Somalia’s consent to be bound by the MOU under international law. 
Regardless of the possibility under international law to conclude a treaty that enters into force upon signature, Somalia has contended that Somali law required ratification of the MOU. A similar question was considered by the Court in the case concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening). In its Judgment on the merits, the Court addressed an argument made by Nigeria that a Declaration, signed by its Head of State and that of Cameroon, was not valid because it had not been ratified in accordance with Nigerian law (I.C.J. Reports 2002, pp. 427-428, para. 258). Having concluded that the relevant agreement had entered into force upon signature under international law (ibid., p. 430, para. 264), the Court went on to consider Article 46 of the Vienna Convention, which provides that: 
“1. A State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance. 
2. A violation is manifest if it would be objectively evident to any State conducting itself in the matter in accordance with normal practice and in good faith.” 

The Court considered that: 
“The rules concerning the authority to sign treaties for a State are constitutional rules of fundamental importance. However, a limitation of a Head of State’s capacity in this respect is not manifest in the sense of Article 46, paragraph 2, unless at least properly publicized. This is particularly so because Heads of State belong to the group of persons who, in accordance with Article 7, paragraph 2, of the Convention ‘[i]n virtue of their functions and without having to produce full powers’ are considered as representing their State.” (Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 430, para. 265.) 
In this case, there is no reason to suppose that Kenya was aware that the signature of the Minister may not have been sufficient under Somali law to express, on behalf of Somalia, consent to a binding international agreement. As already noted, the Prime Minister of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia had, by full powers “authorized and empowered” the Minister, under international law, to sign the MOU. No caveat relating to a need for ratification was mentioned in those full powers, nor in the MOU itself, which on the contrary provided for its entry into force upon signature. As the Court has previously observed, “there is no general legal obligation for States to keep themselves informed of legislative and constitutional developments in other States which are or may become important for the international relations of these States” (ibid., p. 430, para. 266). Moreover, even after the MOU had been rejected by the Somali Parliament, the Prime Minister of Somalia did not question its validity in his letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations dated 19 August 2009. In this respect, the Court observes that under customary international law, reflected in Article 45 of the Vienna Convention, a State may not invoke a ground for invalidating a treaty on the basis of, inter alia, provisions of its internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties if, after having become aware of the facts, it must by reason of its conduct be considered as having acquiesced in the validity of that treaty. Somalia did not begin to express its doubts in this respect until some time later, in March 2010 (see paragraph 38 above). The Court further notes that Somalia has never directly notified Kenya of any alleged defect in its consent to be bound by the MOU. 
In light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that the MOU is a valid treaty that entered into force upon signature and is binding on the Parties under international law. 

2. The interpretation of the MOU 
The Court will now turn to the interpretation of the MOU, which is reproduced above (see paragraph 37). Kenya argues that, in the sixth paragraph of the MOU, which provides that “[t]he delimitation of maritime boundaries in the areas under dispute . . . shall be agreed between the two coastal States . . . after the Commission has concluded its examination of the separate submissions made by each of the two coastal States and made its recommendations”, the Parties agreed on a method of settlement of their maritime boundary dispute. Kenya submits that the agreed method of settlement was an agreement negotiated by the Parties which would only be concluded following receipt of the CLCS’s recommendations, and that recourse to the Court is therefore excluded by virtue of Kenya’s reservation in its optional clause declaration (see paragraphs 31-32). According to Kenya, the MOU’s object and purpose was to agree on such a method for the final settlement of the Parties’ maritime boundary. Kenya maintains that the MOU envisages a “two-step sequencing procedure” in which the Parties agreed not to object to the CLCS submission of the other in order to allow the Commission to consider their submissions and to issue its recommendations and that, following CLCS review, the delimitation of the full extent of the Parties’ maritime boundary would be settled through an agreement. Kenya emphasizes that undertaking the delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles prior to the delimitation of the maritime boundary between the Parties is “logical” as delimitation first requires the determination of the seaward extent of the Parties’ entitlements and the relevant maritime zones. In particular, it submits that review by the CLCS prior to delimitation is important in this case in view of “the concavity of the African coastline on the Indian Ocean [which] produces a magnified cut-off effect for Kenya beyond the 200 [nautical-mile] limit. It is, therefore, necessary to determine precisely the entire maritime area to be delimited in order to arrive at an ‘equitable solution’ in accordance with international law.” Kenya contends that the structure of the MOU makes clear that it was intended to address both delineation and delimitation. It argues that, in the MOU, the Parties first recognized the existence of a maritime delimitation dispute between them (para. 2) and then, at the end of the MOU, agreed on the procedure to settle that dispute (para. 6). It emphasizes that, in the paragraphs which are related to delineation (paras. 3, 4 and 5), the Parties referred to the “future delimitation”. Kenya maintains that the paragraphs of the MOU are therefore all interdependent, and make clear that delimitation was related to delineation, with the Parties establishing a temporal link between the two procedures that gave priority to delineation over delimitation. Accordingly, it contends that, while the text of the MOU provides that delineation is without prejudice to delimitation, the latter was, at the procedural level, to be subject to prior delineation. Thus, Kenya argues, the text of the MOU and its object and purpose “are perfectly coherent”: the Parties agreed not to block the CLCS from making its recommendations, so that they could then carry out the maritime delimitation on the basis of those recommendations. In other words, according to Kenya, the object and purpose of the MOU was to organize the procedures for both delineation and delimitation. Kenya further argues that, regardless of the MOU’s object and purpose, that instrument contains a provision relating to delimitation, namely the sixth paragraph, to which effect must be given, in accordance with the principle of effet utile. 

In respect of that paragraph, Kenya appears to accept that it does not impose an obligation on the Parties to reach an agreement regarding delimitation in the relevant areas, but contends that use of the word “shall” indicates “a legal undertaking, a binding obligation, not merely to negotiate in good faith, but to do so with a view to concluding an agreement”. Kenya also appears to accept that, in the event that negotiations were to prove unsuccessful, the Parties would be able to have recourse to third party dispute settlement procedures under UNCLOS, but argues that such negotiations have not yet been exhausted. 
In addition, Kenya contends that the sixth paragraph imposes a “temporal requirement” that an agreement be concluded only after receipt of the CLCS’s recommendations. Kenya does not submit that the MOU prevented the Parties from negotiating before the CLCS makes its recommendations. Indeed, in its reply to a question asked by a Member of the Court, Kenya accepted that the sixth paragraph of the MOU “obviously does not prohibit the Parties from concluding one or more interim agreements that are subsequently finalized after the recommendation of the CLCS on the terminus point of the outer continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles”. However, in Kenya’s view, even if negotiations prior to receipt of the CLCS’s recommendations “resulted in one or more interim agreements on delimitation covering some or all maritime areas in dispute”, those negotiations would “still be subject to finalization under the MOU’s agreed procedure”. Thus, it argues that while under the MOU the Parties may negotiate, and even agree on some parts of the delimitation, they have to wait for the CLCS’s recommendations before those negotiations can be finalized. 
With regard to the scope of the sixth paragraph of the MOU, Kenya contends that the use of the plural of “maritime boundaries” and “areas under dispute”, as well as the word “including” indicate that all maritime areas were intended to be covered by that paragraph. In any event, Kenya submits that “[a]ny single line of delimitation is . . . composed of a series of indivisible and interdependent delimitations . . . In these circumstances, the overall maritime delimitation depends on the delimitation of the continental shelf” and thus the MOU affects the maritime delimitation as a whole. For its part, Somalia contends that the sixth paragraph of the MOU does not establish a method for the settlement of the boundary dispute between the Parties. Somalia argues that the object and purpose of the MOU was to allow the CLCS to examine the submissions of Somalia and Kenya, without prejudice to their respective delimitation claims. It points out that, according to the Rules of Procedure of the CLCS, that body will not make any recommendations based on submissions made by a State regarding the outer limits of the continental shelf if there is an ongoing dispute with another State. However, it may give consideration to submissions involving areas that are in dispute if that other State gives its consent. Somalia contends that the MOU’s object and purpose was to provide that requisite mutual consent and that, insofar as the MOU addressed the Parties’ delimitation dispute, it was solely to confirm that the agreement on no-objection did not affect, and was without prejudice to, their respective positions. It suggests that it would be “illogical” to require continental shelf delimitation within 200 nautical miles to await delineation beyond 200 nautical miles because the former is not in any way dependent upon the latter. It maintains that the purpose of the MOU’s sixth paragraph was therefore not to settle, or provide a means for settling, the Parties’ maritime boundary dispute, but was instead to insulate that dispute from the effects of the Parties’ understanding on no-objection. 
Somalia submits that the title of the MOU makes clear its object and purpose as a no-objection agreement and that the introductory paragraphs, particularly the third paragraph, also reflect this purpose, as do the fourth and fifth paragraphs, which are concerned with enabling delineation. It emphasizes that, in these introductory and operative paragraphs, including by use of the words “without prejudice”, the MOU treats delineation and delimitation as two distinct processes, neither one dependent on the other except as regards the endpoint of the maritime boundary beyond 200 nautical miles. It contends that the references to “future” delimitation in the text refer solely to actions occurring after the date of signature. Somalia argues that the text of the sixth paragraph “does nothing more than reiterate the Parties’ standing obligation to attempt to agree on the delimitation of their maritime boundary”, pointing to the similarity between that paragraph and Articles paragraph 1, and 83, paragraph 1, of UNCLOS. It compares the use of the passive voice in that paragraph with the more active formulation elsewhere in the text, regarding the sixth paragraph as descriptive rather than prescriptive, and pointing out that other paragraphs, such as the fourth paragraph, contain similarly descriptive language. Consequently, it contends that “[f]ar from establishing a binding agreement to negotiate  and only negotiate  their maritime boundary, and then only after the CLCS has made its recommendations, [the sixth paragraph] merely acknowledges the Parties’ existing obligations under [UNCLOS].” (Emphasis in the original.) In any event, Somalia argues that negotiations between the Parties regarding their maritime boundary have been tried and exhausted. In respect of the alleged temporal requirement contained in the sixth paragraph, Somalia refers to the subsequent practice of the Parties, including in undertaking negotiations with respect to their maritime boundary prior to receiving the recommendations of the CLCS, and argues that the MOU cannot be considered as an “agreement not to agree” in the sense that “[i]t would provide for negotiation of the maritime boundary dispute, but only so long as no agreement was reached” 
(emphasis in the original). It considers that the sixth paragraph of the MOU denotes “that the complete delimitation of the maritime boundaries between the two States shall be carried out by agreement after the CLCS has made its recommendations” (emphasis in the original). In this respect, it argues that “the MOU in no way prevents the Parties from negotiating an agreement . . . however, it cannot be finalized (or ‘completed’) by fixing its terminus until the Commission’s recommendations have been received” (emphasis in the original). It contends that this does not mean that the Parties cannot agree on the direction of the line of delimitation before the CLCS has made its position known, or that the Court must wait for the CLCS’s recommendations before proceeding to a delimitation. 
As to the scope of the sixth paragraph, Somalia contends that “the MOU itself defines the maritime area in dispute strictly in terms of the continental shelf” and makes no reference to the territorial sea or the exclusive economic zone. It considers that the MOU is concerned only with the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles and observes that it contains no reference to the maritime boundary within 200 nautical miles. In respect of the use of plurals in the sixth paragraph, Somalia points out that both the singular “area” and plural “areas” are used interchangeably in the MOU and contends that the word “including” simply reflects the fact that the two States will not be able to determine the endpoint of their common maritime boundary until the CLCS’s recommendations have been received. Somalia suggests that the circumstances of conclusion and drafting history of the MOU confirm its interpretation, pointing particularly to statements made by the Norwegian diplomat involved in the drafting of the MOU, as well as Norway itself. In interpreting the MOU, the Court will apply the rules on interpretation to be found in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention, which it has consistently considered to be reflective of customary international law (see, e.g., Question of the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Nicaragua and Colombia beyond 200 nautical miles from the Nicaraguan Coast (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 17 March 2016, para. 33; Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 237, para. 47, referring to Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), pp. 109-110, para. 160 and Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1994, pp. 21-22, para. 41; Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Preliminary Objection, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), p. 812, para. 23). 
64. Article 31, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention provides that “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose”. These elements of interpretation  ordinary meaning, context and object and purpose  are to be considered as a whole. Paragraph 2 of Article 31 sets out what is to be regarded as context. Article 31, 
paragraph 3, provides that there shall be taken into account, together with the context, any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation or application of the treaty, any subsequent practice which establishes such an agreement, and any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties. 
The sixth paragraph of the MOU is at the heart of the first preliminary objection currently under consideration. It is, however, difficult to understand that paragraph without a prior analysis of the text of the MOU as a whole, which provides the context in which any particular paragraph should be interpreted and gives insight into the object and purpose of the MOU. The Court will therefore proceed first of all to such an analysis. It will then turn to an examination of the sixth paragraph. As the MOU makes reference to the role of the CLCS in the process of the delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, it is useful first to clarify the framework within which the Commission operates. It will be recalled that Article 76, paragraph 8, of UNCLOS provides that: 
“Information on the limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured shall be submitted by the coastal State to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf set up under Annex II on the basis of equitable geographical representation. The Commission shall make recommendations to coastal States on matters related to the establishment of the outer limits of their continental shelf. The limits of the shelf established by a coastal State on the basis of these recommendations shall be final and binding.” 
The effect of this provision is that, for States parties to UNCLOS, the establishment of “final and binding” outer limits for their continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles depends on information having been submitted to the CLCS, the CLCS having made recommendations thereon, and the relevant State having established its limits “on the basis of [those] recommendations” (see generally Question of the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Nicaragua and Colombia beyond 200 nautical miles from the Nicaraguan Coast (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 17 March 2016, paras. 107-108). 
As the Court has recently observed, “the role of the CLCS relates only to the delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf, and not delimitation” (ibid., para. 110). The two tasks are distinct (ibid., para. 112) and the delimitation of the continental shelf “can be undertaken independently of a recommendation from the CLCS” (ibid., para. 114). In this respect, Article 76, paragraph 10, of UNCLOS provides that “[t]he provisions of this article are without prejudice to the question of delimitation of the continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts”. Nonetheless, as the Court has highlighted, “it is possible that the two operations may impact upon one another” and the rules of the CLCS therefore contain provisions that seek “to ensure that its actions do not prejudice matters relating to delimitation” (ibid., para. 113). In this respect, paragraphs 1 and 2 of Rule 46 of the Rules of Procedure of the CLCS, which is entitled “Submissions in case of a dispute between States with opposite or adjacent coasts or in other cases of unresolved land or maritime disputes”, provide:

“1. In case there is a dispute in the delimitation of the continental shelf between opposite or adjacent States or in other cases of unresolved land or maritime disputes, submissions may be made and shall be considered in accordance with Annex I to these Rules. 

2. The actions of the Commission shall not prejudice matters relating to the delimitation of boundaries between States.” 
Article 5 of Annex I, referred to therein, provides: 
“5. (a) In cases where a land or maritime dispute exists, the Commission shall not consider and qualify a submission made by any of the States concerned in the dispute. However, the Commission may consider one or more submissions in the areas under dispute with prior consent given by all States that are parties to such a dispute. 
(b) The submissions made before the Commission and the recommendations approved by the Commission thereon shall not prejudice the position of States which are parties to a land or maritime dispute.” 
The CLCS has therefore taken the approach that it will not consider a submission made by a State, nor issue recommendations in respect thereof, if there is a maritime delimitation dispute between that State and one or more other States, without the consent of all States concerned. A State will thus be unable to establish the outer limits of its continental shelf if it has a dispute with one or more other States and they have not consented to the consideration of its submission by the CLCS.

The title of the MOU and its first five paragraphs indicate the purpose of ensuring that the CLCS could proceed to consider submissions made by Somalia and Kenya regarding the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, and to issue recommendations thereon, notwithstanding the existence of a maritime dispute between the two States, thus preserving the distinction between the ultimate delimitation of the maritime boundary and the CLCS process leading to delineation. Indeed, Kenya does not deny that one of the purposes of the MOU is to enable delineation to take place, though it suggests that this is a stepping-stone toward achieving the objective of reaching a final maritime delimitation by agreement after receipt of the recommendations of the CLCS. The Court observes that there are various references to maritime delimitation throughout the text of the MOU, in addition to that found in the sixth paragraph. However, none of these references to maritime delimitation elsewhere in the text of the MOU supports Kenya’s contention that the MOU serves the purpose of providing a method for settling the dispute relating to the delimitation of the Parties’ maritime boundary. The references to maritime delimitation that appear outside of the sixth paragraph fulfil two functions. 
The first function of the references to delimitation is to define the delimitation dispute between the Parties in order to establish that the Parties may include the “area under dispute” in their respective submissions to the CLCS and to allow the Commission, irrespective of that dispute, to issue its recommendations. In this respect, the second paragraph of the MOU refers to the “unresolved delimitation issue” between the Parties and defines it as a “maritime dispute”, before going on to define the “area under dispute”, which is then referred to in the fourth and fifth paragraphs. These references to maritime delimitation do nothing more than further the objective of securing no-objection by either Party to the consideration of the submission of the other Party by the CLCS notwithstanding the delimitation dispute between them. The second function of the references to delimitation is to make clear that the CLCS process leading to the delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf is without prejudice to the Parties’ dispute regarding maritime delimitation and its resolution. The third paragraph provides that the establishment of outer limits is “without prejudice to the question of delimitation of the continental shelf” and that the Parties’ interest in such delineation is “without prejudice to the future delimitation of the continental shelf”. In the fourth and fifth paragraphs, Somalia’s submission of preliminary information, the two States’ submissions to the CLCS and the recommendations of the CLCS are said to be “without prejudice to the future delimitation of maritime boundaries in the area under dispute”. The question of delimitation was therefore to be kept separate from the process leading to the delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf, suggesting that if the MOU addressed delineation it did not, at least in the first five paragraphs, address delimitation or treat delineation as a step in the process of delimitation. It is true that the MOU refers to “future delimitation” a number of times. This suggests that the process leading to delineation was to be prioritized, in a temporal sense, over delimitation. However, the Parties agree that the MOU of 7 April 2009 was signed in the context of the fast-approaching deadline by which Somalia and Kenya had either to file preliminary information with, or to make their submission to, the CLCS (see paragraph 16 above). In those circumstances, it is unsurprising that commencing the process that would lead to the delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf would take priority over the resolution of delimitation issues between the Parties and that, at least from the point in time of signing the MOU, any such delimitation would be in the future. While the fifth paragraph of the MOU, in providing, inter alia, that the recommendations of the CLCS “shall be without prejudice to the future delimitation”, could be construed as implying that delimitation was to occur after the recommendations of the CLCS had been made, the Court is not convinced that the use of the word “future” in this context can be taken, in and of itself, to indicate a temporal restriction on when delimitation was to take place. The sixth paragraph does contain a more explicit reference to delimitation occurring “after” the CLCS has made its recommendations. This may suggest that the Parties contemplated that delimitation would occur after the respective outer limits of their continental shelf had been delineated. However, this does not necessarily mean that they intended to bind themselves to proceed to delimitation only in that way. The question for the Court is whether the Parties, in that sixth paragraph, agreed on a method of settlement of their delimitation dispute other than by way of proceedings before the Court, and agreed to wait for the CLCS’s recommendations before any such settlement could be reached. 
It will be recalled that the sixth paragraph of the MOU provides: 
“The delimitation of maritime boundaries in the areas under dispute, including the delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, shall be agreed between the two coastal States on the basis of international law after the Commission has concluded its examination of the separate submissions made by each of the two coastal States and made its recommendations to two coastal States concerning the establishment of the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles.” It is appropriate first to clarify to which maritime zones that paragraph refers. This has implications for the interpretation of the MOU and also for the extent to which Kenya’s reservation might be applicable, if at all, in this case. The subject-matter of the sixth paragraph of the MOU relates to “[t]he delimitation of maritime boundaries in the areas under dispute, including the delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles . . .”. The use of the word “including” implies that the Parties intended something more to be encompassed by delimitation in “the areas under dispute” than delimitation in respect of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. Clarification is provided in the second paragraph of the MOU, which outlines that: “The delimitation of the continental shelf between the Republic of Kenya and the Somali Republic (hereinafter collectively referred to as ‘the two coastal States’) has not yet been settled. This unresolved delimitation issue between the two coastal States is to be considered as a ‘maritime dispute’. The claims of the two coastal States cover an overlapping area of the continental shelf which constitutes the ‘area under dispute’.” (Emphasis added.) 

The Court has previously rejected Kenya’s contention that the MOU contained an agreement to settle the Parties’ maritime boundary dispute by negotiation and only after the completion of CLCS review of the Parties’ submissions (see paragraphs 98 and 106 above). Thus, having rejected the premise on which this ground of inadmissibility is based, the Court must also reject this aspect of Kenya’s second preliminary objection. Secondly, Kenya states that the Application is inadmissible because Somalia breached the MOU by objecting to CLCS consideration of Kenya’s submission, only to consent again immediately before filing its Memorial. According to Kenya, the withdrawal of consent was a breach of Somalia’s obligations under the MOU that gave rise to significant costs and delays. Kenya also contends that a State “seeking relief before the Court must come with clean hands” and that Somalia has not done so. Consequently, it argues, Somalia’s Application is inadmissible. 
Somalia responds to this contention by claiming that “even if [it] were in breach of the MOU — which it is not — this would not preclude Somalia from invoking its entirely separate rights under Article 36 (2) of the Statute”. Somalia adds that it has withdrawn its objection to CLCS consideration of Kenya’s submission, which “is now before the CLCS, without any real delay”. In addition, Somalia maintains that the “‘unclean hands’ doctrine” has never been recognized by the Court and that “the Court’s case law confirms that accusations of bad faith of the type levelled against Somalia cannot bar the admissibility of an Application”. 
The Court recalls that, in a letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations dated 10 October 2009, forwarded to him under cover of a letter dated 2 March 2010, Somalia requested that the MOU be treated “as non-actionable” (see paragraph 18 above). Somalia objected to consideration by the CLCS of Kenya’s submission by letter dated 4 February 2014. It withdrew this objection by letter of 7 July 2015 (see paragraphs 19 and 26 above). 
The Court observes that the fact that an applicant may have breached a treaty at issue in the case does not per se affect the admissibility of its application. Moreover, the Court notes that Somalia is neither relying on the MOU as an instrument conferring jurisdiction on the Court nor as a source of substantive law governing the merits of this case. 
Thus, Somalia’s objection to CLCS consideration of Kenya’s submission does not render the Application inadmissible. In the circumstances of this case, there is no need for the Court to address the more general question whether there are situations in which the conduct of an applicant would be of such a character as to render its application inadmissible. 

 In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the preliminary objection to the admissibility of Somalia’s Application must be rejected. For these reasons, 

THE COURT, 
(1) (a) by thirteen votes to three, 
Rejects the first preliminary objection raised by the Republic of Kenya in so far as it is based on the Memorandum of Understanding of 7 April 2009; 
IN FAVOUR: President Abraham; Vice-President Yusuf; Judges Owada, Tomka, Cançado Trindade, Greenwood, Xue, Donoghue, Gaja, Sebutinde, Bhandari, Crawford, Gevorgian; 
AGAINST: Judges Bennouna, Robinson; Judge ad hoc Guillaume; 
(b) by fifteen votes to one, 
Rejects the first preliminary objection raised by the Republic of Kenya in so far as it is based on Part XV of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea; 
IN FAVOUR: President Abraham; Vice-President Yusuf; Judges Owada, Tomka, Bennouna, Cançado Trindade, Greenwood, Xue, Donoghue, Gaja, Sebutinde, Bhandari, Crawford, Gevorgian; Judge ad hoc Guillaume; 
AGAINST: Judge Robinson; 
(2) by fifteen votes to one, 
Rejects the second preliminary objection raised by the Republic of Kenya; 
IN FAVOUR: President Abraham; Vice-President Yusuf; Judges Owada, Tomka, Bennouna, Cançado Trindade, Greenwood, Xue, Donoghue, Gaja, Sebutinde, Bhandari, Crawford, Gevorgian; Judge ad hoc Guillaume; 
AGAINST: Judge Robinson; 

(3) by thirteen votes to three, 
Finds that it has jurisdiction to entertain the Application filed by the Federal Republic of Somalia on 28 August 2014 and that the Application is admissible. 
IN FAVOUR: President Abraham; Vice-President Yusuf; Judges Owada, Tomka, Cançado Trindade, Greenwood, Xue, Donoghue, Gaja, Sebutinde, Bhandari, Crawford, Gevorgian; 
AGAINST: Judges Bennouna, Robinson; Judge ad hoc Guillaume. 
Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative, at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this second day of February, two thousand and seventeen, in three copies, one of which will be placed in the archives of the Court and the others transmitted to the Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia and the Government of the Republic of Kenya, respectively. 



(Signed) Ronny ABRAHAM, President. 



(Signed) Philippe COUVREUR, Registrar. 



Vice-President YUSUF appends a declaration to the Judgment of the Court; Judge BENNOUNA appends a dissenting opinion to the Judgment of the Court; Judges GAJA and CRAWFORD append a joint declaration to the Judgment of the Court; Judge ROBINSON appends a dissenting opinion to the Judgment of the Court; Judge ad hoc GUILLAUME appends a dissenting opinion to the Judgment of the Court.

Dec.4, 2017

Top UK diplomat Sir Ivan Roger resigns unexpectedly. He wrote "speak truth to power".

He warns of what he called "muddlet thinking" and shortage of Whitehall negotiating experience. PM May facing claims government turning deaf ear to BREXIT advice it doesn´t want to hear.

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